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Abstract

The purpose of this research is to characterize the number and type of problems satellite
operators encounter during the course of routine daily activities.  In the context of this paper,
a discrepancy is defined as the perception by an operator that some portion of the space
system has failed to operate as designed.  Discrepancies can therefore include ground system
malfunctions, procedural errors, and even misdiagnosis that a problem exists, in addition to
actual spacecraft anomalies.  The study is designed to test the following hypotheses using a
verifiable, quantitative analysis: 1) the majority of problems encountered by an operator do
not involve the spacecraft at all, but are attributed to other elements of the space system; and
2) correlations exist between aspects of a space system design and the nature of problems
experienced by the operations staff over the long term. 

To perform an applied, rather than theoretical, analysis, several representative aerospace
organizations provided historical discrepancy reports for satellites currently being flown.
Government civilian and military organizations participated in the study, which encompassed
spacecraft from several mission areas, including remote sensing, research & development,
communications, and observatories.  Raw discrepancy data was collected from each
organization in the form of electronic databases or hand-written logs.  Data conversion
consisted of selecting similar fields of interest from each database; removing references to
the program, organization, or spacecraft; replacing program-specific terminology with
standardized nomenclature; and merging the individual databases into one data set.
Statistical analysis of the entire data set was performed to test the two hypotheses above.

The results of the analysis found that 13% of all discrepancies reported are associated with
subsystems on board the spacecraft, while the remaining 87% are attributed to the operations
infrastructure, including ground systems, communications relays, facilities, and associated
equipment.  Correlations were found between certain design characteristics and the types of
discrepancies reported for a given mission.  In addition, software problems were the root
cause in an average 48% of the discrepancies reported for each mission. 
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Executive Summary

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to characterize the number and type of problems satellite
operators encounter during the course of routine daily activities.  Problems – regardless of
cause, associated subsystem, and effect – are a source of uncertainty and cost in satellite
operations.  Spacecraft designers, integrators, and operators take extraordinary precautions to
avoid defects once a spacecraft is on-orbit.  Yet despite all the care and attention devoted to
this cause, problems of all types still occur. 

Unfortunately, there is a notable lack of published data concerning the day-to-day issues
affecting satellite operations.  What types of problems will a satellite operator encounter
during a typical week, month, or year of work?  How often will these problems occur?
Although experienced members of an operations staff can usually provide estimates based on
anecdotal evidence, there exists no precedent for making this information available to the
aerospace community at large. 

Several studies have documented the failure history of spacecraft components, but these
studies do not capture the full scope of problems that an operator might face.  On a routine
daily basis, satellite operators may encounter problems completely unrelated to the spacecraft
and unaffected by its performance.  Lifecycle operations play an important role in a typical
space system enterprise, and one that is sometimes neglected or ignored.  For satellites with a
long design life or a particularly complex ops concept, the operations phase may easily
surpass the design and manufacturing stages in terms of time and cost.  Therefore, all the
problems encountered during the operations phase – including those not related to the
spacecraft – should be documented, hence the motivation for this study. 

The study is designed to test the following hypotheses using a verifiable, quantitative
analysis:
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• First hypothesis. Most problems encountered by an operator do not involve the
spacecraft at all, but are attributed to other elements of the space system.
• Second hypothesis.  Correlations exist between aspects of a space system design and
the nature of problems experienced by the operations staff over the long term.

In the context of this paper, a discrepancy is defined as the perception by an operator that
some portion of the space system has failed to operate as designed.  Discrepancies can
therefore include ground system malfunctions, procedural errors, and even misdiagnosis that
a problem exists, in addition to actual spacecraft anomalies.

Methodology

Several government civilian and military satellite programs were contacted about
contributing discrepancy data for this study.  Although the names and formats of the reports
varied greatly, all of the programs maintained some form of documentation for the problems
they encountered.  The documentation targeted for this study was the first-response problem
logging or reporting performed by the on-console operators, if available.  When provided in
the form of hand-written logs, individual entries were first manually entered into electronic
format.  Hardcopy forms and incident reports were scanned using optical character
recognition (OCR) software and reviewed for accuracy.  Source data provided in the form of
proprietary or mission-specific electronic databases were first exported to tab-delimited text
files.  In each of the three cases, the result was a generic text file containing all the original
source data, which could be manipulated by a variety of software tools.

All of the source data sets used a unique format in terms of structure, data requested, field
names, etc.  In order merge the data into one uniform database, several modifications were
made to each set.  To begin with, a standard data format was defined using a core set of
information common to a large majority of the source sets.  Unnecessary or extraneous data
fields were removed from the source data sets, and the pseudonym for the contributing
organization was added to every entry in the file. 
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The next data preparation step was accomplished to address concerns about the release of
proprietary data.  References to spacecraft names, payload instruments, personnel teams,
unique facilities, or specific equipment configurations were replaced with generic descriptive
terms.  At this point in the process, the discrepancy reports were normalized on the basis of
each spacecraft.  This was accomplished by dividing the number of discrepancies associated
with each subsystem or cause for a given spacecraft by the sum total of the spacecraft’s
discrepancies.  The resulting data observations for the spacecraft were a set of percentages,
one for each subsystem or cause, which described the distribution of problems among the
various categories.

Results

Figure 1 shows the percentage of all reported discrepancies that belong to each subsystem
category. 

Figure 1 – Percentage of All Discrepancies Reported vs. Associated Subsystem
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The diagram indicates that the two subsystems most frequently associated with discrepancies
were ground systems and communications relays.  The result of the normalization process is
a set of percentages representing the fraction of discrepancies for each spacecraft that are
associated with each subsystem category.  The percentages can be analyzed to determine
whether or not a particular subsystem is consistently identified as a problem across multiple
spacecraft programs.  Figure 2 gives a more accurate presentation of the fact that ground
systems, in particular, and to some extent communications relays are consistently attributed
to discrepancies across several different spacecraft programs.

Figure 2 – Box Plot of Subsystem Statistics
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Most of the discrepancy data sets contributed for this study contained root cause information
in each report.  Those that did not were excluded from this portion of the analysis.  In a
similar fashion as the subsystem category, the first step is to report the number of
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discrepancies belonging to each subsystem category.  This is accomplished with the category
relative frequency diagram shown in Figure 3.  The diagram indicates that software problems
are the most frequent cause of discrepancies, occurring in 61% of the reported cases.  The
equipment, unknown, procedure, and no anomaly categories were comparable at
approximately 7% each. 

Figure 3 – Percentage of All Discrepancies Reported vs. Root Cause
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The normalization process can also be applied to the root cause analysis to prevent one or
two spacecraft from skewing the results.  When the data is normalized on a per-spacecraft
basis, the resulting statistical parameters for each root cause category are shown graphically
using a box plot in Figure 4.  The diagram shows that software is the only root cause
category consistently reported as a frequently occurring problem among all of the spacecraft
in the dataset.
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Figure 4 – Box Plot of Root Cause Statistics
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Conclusions

An analysis of over 9,200 discrepancy reports from 11 on-orbit spacecraft supports the first
hypothesis – 87% of the discrepancies collected were attributed to some component of the
operational infrastructure.  The remaining 13% involved one or more components on board
the spacecraft.  Software was the most frequently reported cause of discrepancies, found in
61% of all discrepancies documented. 

The discrepancy reports also indicated that correlations do exist between certain design
elements and the types of problems experienced during operations.  The following
correlations were found based on the data collected:
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• Ground System vs. Mission Type.  The percentage of discrepancies per spacecraft
associated with the ground system tends to change given a particular mission type for
the spacecraft.

• Comm Relay vs. Ops Team.   The percentage of discrepancies per spacecraft
associated with the communications relay tends to change from one organization to
another.

Thus, the data collected supports the second hypothesis, but with the caveat that a sufficiently
large and diverse sample set must be obtained to verify the results.  It should be noted that
causality cannot be determined from the statistical correlation analysis, but must be
investigated on a case-by-case basis.

The results of this study can be extended by incorporating discrepancy data from additional
spacecraft, particularly commercial programs.  The methodology can also be applied on
databases for individual satellite programs to gain insight into the nature and frequency of
problems experienced by the operations staff.  Ultimately, this can help supervisors identify
strengths and areas for improvement in attempt to continuously improve the service provided
to the user.

Characterization of Operator-Reported Discrepancies in Unmanned On-Orbit Space Systems
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Chapter 1 – Introduction


There exists a great deal of literature on the theory and application of lean principles.  The
purpose of this section is neither to expand upon existing theory nor to serve as an exhaustive
summary of available literature.  It is intended to provide only a very brief introduction to
lean principles so the reader will understand the context in which this research was
conducted.  The book Lean Thinking, by James Womack and Daniel Jones, contains a much
more thorough treatment of this subject and is generally considered the best source on the
background and application of lean principles.  Thus, this chapter simply recounts the origins
of lean, the creation of the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI), and the underlying motivation
for operational satellite discrepancy research.

Origins of Lean

The origins of current theory on lean principles can be traced back to manufacturing
techniques implemented at Toyota Motor Company following World War II.  In the years
immediately following the war, executives at Toyota searched for ways to catch up to the
manufacturing capabilities of their American counterparts.  The task and responsibility fell
primarily on Toyota’s chief production engineer, Taiichi Ohno.  After several fact-finding
trips to American auto factories, Ohno eventually realized that Japan simply did not have the
resources or the market base to sustain the tremendous level of mass production taking place
in the United States.  What he needed to find, instead, was a more efficient way to deliver the
exact products his customers wanted as quickly and as cheaply as possible.1   The various
manufacturing techniques he developed, and more importantly, the process by which he
developed them, collectively form the basis of the management theory now known as ‘lean.’

Womack and Jones summarize Ohno’s approach using five principles of lean:2
                                              
1
 Ohno, Taiichi.  Toyota Production System: Beyond Large-Scale Production.  Cambridge, MA: Productivity
Press, 1988.  pp. 1-3.
2
 Womack, James P. and Daniel T. Jones.  Lean Thinking: Banish Waste and Create Wealth in Your
Corporation.  New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996.  pp. 15-98.
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• Value.   The first and critical step is defining what is important, and therefore has
value, from the perspective of the end customer.  It may be a product, a service, or a
combination of the two.  The definition of value should include not only what the
customer wants, but also how it should be provided, when it should be provided, and
at what cost.

• The Value Stream.   Once the concept of value is defined, every activity – from the
collection of raw materials to the delivery, use, and maintenance of the final product –
must be examined and categorized as value-added, wasteful but necessary given
current constraints, or wasteful and unnecessary.  Value-added activities directly
contribute to the form, fit, and function of a product or the successful performance of
a service.  Wasteful activities generally can be categorized as one of seven types:
over-production, waiting, transportation, inventory, processing, motion, and defects.
The goal is to eventually completely eliminate waste from the value stream.

• Flow.  Once the value stream is thoroughly mapped and as much waste as possible
eliminated, the remaining value-added activities must be organized to allow
continuous flow.  Ohno’s implementation focused on single-piece flow through the
assembly line, as opposed to the batch-and-queue method.  He achieved this using
production cells capable of accomplishing their tasks according to a predefined takt
time.  The recognition of time as a critical commodity, and the emphasis on
synchronizing work in a precise fashion, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of
lean.  Ohno also relied on personnel who were organized along product lines or
processes, rather than functions or departments.

• Pull.   Continuous flow makes it possible for a customer to ‘pull’ products or services
from a company, rather than a company pushing products or services onto the
customer.  This creates a ripple effect that reaches all the way back through the value
stream to the original suppliers.  The combination of continuous single-piece flow
and pull is sometimes called just-in-time manufacturing, which requires an ability to
Characterization of Operator-Reported Discrepancies in Unmanned On-Orbit Space Systems
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rapidly changeover from one product to another and to produce parts with a defect
rate near zero.

• Perfection.   The initial implementation of the first four principles is not enough.
They must be accomplished repeatedly in an iterative fashion, always looking for
ways to improve the product or service and eliminate waste.  This step tends to
capitalize on the knowledge and expertise of the workers actually performing the
tasks on a daily basis.

Even more important than the techniques Ohno developed is the process he used to
implement and perfect them.  These radical manufacturing improvements did not occur
overnight.  In fact, it took Toyota almost thirty years to tweak and fine tune its manufacturing
methods, but the result was an assembly line that, by the mid-1980s, easily led in the world in
terms of efficiency, flexibility, and quality.3   Success was achieved by taking advantage of
workers’ knowledge and expertise – and encouraging them to suggest and test improvements
in a controlled, measurable, and repeatable fashion.4 

After losing tremendous amounts of market share and profit to the Japanese in the 1980s,
American automotive companies forced themselves to learn the principles of the Toyota
Production System.  Ford Motor Company purchased a 24% share of Mazda and set about
learning as much as possible from the company’s production complex in Hiroshima.5   GM
launched a joint venture with Toyota, called NUMMI, which was located in California.  In
both cases, the American companies began to catch up with their Japanese counterparts.  By
1989, American-owned auto factories in North America were approaching the level of
productivity found in Japanese-owned plants.

                                              
3
 Womack, James P., Daniel T. Jones, and Daniel Roos.  The Machine That Changed the World: The Story of
Lean Production.  New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 1991.  pp. 75-103.
4
 Spear, Steven and H. Kent Bowen.  “Decoding the DNA of the Toyota Production System,” Harvard Business
Review.  (Sept-Oct) Case # 99509.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing, 1999.  pp. 97-106.
5
 Womack, James P., Daniel T. Jones, and Daniel Roos.  The Machine That Changed the World: The Story of
Lean Production.  New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 1991.  pp. 237-238.
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Creation of the Lean Aerospace Initiative

At about the same time American automotive companies began to realize the benefits of
converting to lean production, key players in the Department of Defense and industry began
to question whether or not it would be possible to apply those same lessons to the aerospace
sector.  The Lean Aircraft Initiative was created in 1993 as a research partnership between
the U.S. Air Force, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, defense aerospace companies,
and labor unions.  Its original charter was to examine how the lean principles could be
applied to aircraft manufacturing, but with the addition of several other government agencies
and companies by 1998, the scope of the Lean Aircraft Initiative was broadened to include
spacecraft and its name changed to the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI).

The Lean Enterprise Model (LEM) is one of the first and most significant products developed
by LAI.  Introduced in June 1996, the LEM is a systematic framework for organizing and
disseminating MIT research and external data source results.6   It contains an enterprise-level
summary of lean principles and overarching practices, as well as underlying metrics that are
useful for quantifying and measuring various aspects of lean performance.  The LEM helps
members of the aerospace community find research related to particular problem areas, and
can be used as a reference tool for a lean self-assessment.

This research is sponsored by the Lean Aerospace Initiative and applies to the following
areas of the LEM:7
• Identify and Optimize Enterprise Flow.   In order to optimize the flow of services
provided by the satellite operations community, any deviations from normal operating
conditions must be identified.  Discrepancies, which represent such deviations, must
therefore be characterized.
• Ensure Process Capability and Maturation.   Once the deviations from normal
operating conditions have been identified, steps must be taken to eliminate them
                                              
6
 Lean Aerospace Initiative.  “Welcome to the Lean Enterprise Model.”  Online reference,
http://lean.mit.edu/newlem2/, March 15, 2001.
7
 Lean Aerospace Initiative, “The Lean Enterprise Model.”  Summary Chart with Enabling Practices.
Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  July 1998.
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wherever possible.  Existing satellite operations can be improved by taking action to
correct the most frequently occurring discrepancies.
• Continuously Focus on the Customer.  To prevent the same types of problems from
occurring over and over again, future satellite programs can take advantage of these
lessons to incorporate corrective measures directly into the design.

Motivation for Research

Early in the 1990s, lean theory expanded from its origins as a production management
method to include the concept of the lean enterprise.  Companies in the process of
implementing lean principles realized that in order to reap the full rewards of lean, every
aspect of their business – not just the factory floor – had to be improved.  It became
necessary to apply lean principles to business areas as diverse as purchasing, accounting,
sales, shipping, logistics, and support.  This extended all the way from the roots of the
supplier network through the long-term use and maintenance of the product by the customer. 

The aerospace sector is no exception to this rule.  For a typical space system, the entire
enterprise includes an acquisition or procurement branch, the integrating organization and its
subcontractors and suppliers, the launch system, the operating organization and its
infrastructure, and the various users of the system or data.  Lifecycle operations play an
important role in the enterprise, and one that is sometimes neglected or ignored.  For
satellites with a long design life or a particularly complex ops concept, the operations phase
may easily surpass the design and manufacturing stages in terms of time and cost.  Therefore,
any thorough application of lean principles to a space system must include the operations
phase, hence the motivation for this study.

The purpose of this research is to characterize the number and type of problems satellite
operators encounter during the course of routine daily activities.  Chapter 2 provides
background on the need for discrepancy research within the aerospace community.  Chapter
3 highlights the hypotheses tested in this thesis and provides an overview of the research
structure.  Chapter 4 details the characterization of discrepancies, while Chapter 5 outlines
  Chapter 1 – Introduction
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the statistical methods used to analyze them.  The results of the analyses are presented in
Chapter 6, with final discussion and conclusions in Chapter 7.

LAI researcher Annalisa Weigel laid the foundation for this paper with her study of satellite
manufacturing discrepancies identified during the system integration and test phase of
factory operations.8   The methods and analyses described in Chapter 5 are kept consistent
wherever possible, to allow easy and accurate comparison of results.



                                              
8
 Weigel, Annalisa.  “Spacecraft System-Level Integration and Test Discrepancies: Characterizing Distributions
and Costs.”  Thesis.  Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000.
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Chapter 2 – Background on Discrepancies


Problems – regardless of cause, associated subsystem, and effect – are a tremendous source
of uncertainty and cost in satellite operations.  Spacecraft designers add redundant
subsystems to minimize the impact of problems that will inevitably occur over the lifetime of
the system.  Operations concepts are designed to prevent the possibility of obvious single
point failures.  Operators take methodically planned precautionary measures to avoid even
the slightest potential for problems.  Every action is taken with the knowledge that one
seemingly trivial mistake can lead to the catastrophic failure of a multi-million dollar
spacecraft.  Yet despite all the care and attention devoted to space systems, problems of all
types still occur. 

Unfortunately, there is a notable lack of published data concerning the day-to-day issues
affecting satellite operations.  What types of problems will a satellite operator encounter
during a typical week, month, or year of work?  How often will these problems occur?
Although experienced members of an operations staff can usually provide estimates based on
anecdotal evidence, there exists no precedent for making this information available to the
aerospace community at large.  This chapter outlines several reasons for the lack of detailed
discrepancy data, examines the corresponding impacts of the lack of data, and summarizes
the potential applications of discrepancy data once it is made available.

Reasons for the Lack of Discrepancy Data

There are several reasons why satellite operations organizations do not publish discrepancy
data.  Although the specific reasons vary from one organization to another, and from one
individual to another, they are generally comprised of some combination of the reasons
outlined below:
• Confidentiality. Many companies fear that releasing discrepancy data reveals
proprietary information about the way they conduct operations and the tools they use
to do the job.  Some feel that revealing this information would even cause a loss of
  Chapter 2 – Background on Discrepancies
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competitive advantage.  This is in contrast to the practice of releasing status and
anomaly information about the spacecraft itself, which users have a legitimate right to
know.  Military organizations have a similar issue in that most discrepancy data is
automatically classified on the grounds it reveals too much information about the
state of military readiness, or more importantly, lack thereof.  The same is true of
national assets, which are not represented in this study due to the security issues
involved but which would undoubtedly reflect interesting trends in discrepancy data.
In general, this issue can be mitigated using the data masking and normalizing
techniques explained in Chapter 5.

• Exposure of weaknesses.   There is often a general uneasiness, if not fear, amongst
operators about releasing discrepancy data.  It exposes intimate details about the
nature of an operations facility that most people would prefer remain private.  Some
managers and supervisors may feel that discrepancies reflect poorly on their ability to
run an operations facility, while rank-and-file operators may feel discrepancies
indicate a lack of skill.  Unfortunately, this hesitation is a result of human nature and
is difficult to overcome.  One solution is to reassure operators of the non-attribution
method of data collection, masking, and reporting by an impartial third party, like
LAI.

• Additional work/cost.  Publishing data – discrepancy or otherwise – does in fact
require an additional measure of labor on the part of the operations staff.  In many
cases, cost and staffing constraints may be so tight that the organization cannot afford
the additional work.  This problem can be overcome if an externally funded third
party is available to perform the analysis at no additional cost and minimal effort on
the part of the operations staff.  This study was designed to minimize the impact of
participation to approximately 10 labor-hours per organization, which typically
included a background briefing, the preparation and submission of data, a follow-up
interview, and a post-study debriefing.
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• Lack of perceived value.   The benefits to an operations organization of publishing its
discrepancy data are not immediately apparent.  Since so few organizations currently
publish, or even analyze, their discrepancy data, it is easy to question the utility of
such a practice.  One of the goals of this study is to make the case for discrepancy
data research by presenting the type of useful information gleaned from a preliminary
analysis.  The applications of discrepancy data research are explored more fully later
in this chapter, and results of the analysis are presented in Chapter 6.

• Lack of precedent.   When a particular practice is not commonplace within the
aerospace community, as is the case with discrepancy data analysis, it typically takes
a determined effort to overcome institutional inertia.  The effort involved in changing
the course of inertia and adopting a new practice may be too great even for
proponents of the practice.  At the very least, this paper can serve as one reference
that discrepancy data analysis is indeed possible, and that even a rudimentary analysis
can reveal meaningful insights into the conduct of satellite operations.

The methods used for this study were designed, in part, to address the concerns highlighted
above.  Sponsorship by the Lean Aerospace Initiative was crucial for maintaining an
unbiased, impartial third-party perspective when dealing with several different organizations,
some of which are in direct competition with each other.

Impacts of the Lack of Discrepancy Data

Since there is no basis for comparison, the impacts of the lack of detailed discrepancy data
cannot be assessed in a quantitative fashion.  However, this section will point out areas in
which existing problems within the operations community can be addressed in part using a
thorough analysis of discrepancy data.

Recent government acquisition reform efforts advocate, among other things, an increased
awareness of system operability.  Emphasis is placed on acquiring systems that are designed
to improve operability.  But what exactly constitutes ‘operability’ for a space system?
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According to the U.S. Air Force’s 2025  Final Report, the definition is “the ability to mount
and sustain aerospace operations regardless of the nature of threat, level of conflict,
environmental conditions, and/or geographic location.”9   But more precise definitions of
operability for a given space system can vary depending on its mission and the individual
operators involved.

Since there is no universal definition for operability, another approach is to examine what
operability is not.  Space systems that are prone to problems are less ‘operable’ than space
systems that are consistently trouble-free.  Thus, one way to at least partially improve
operability for a given space system is to find ways to prevent problems from occurring.
With a lack of operational discrepancy data, however, design engineers revert back to what
they know – how to prevent problems onboard the spacecraft – when in fact, they might be
overlooking several larger sources of problems in the process.  An analysis of discrepancy
data from similar space systems would identify the largest potential sources of problems for a
new space system.

There are a few examples of satellite programs that use a subset of operational discrepancy
data to make improvements to future spacecraft, including the Air Force’s Global Positioning
System and Defense Support Program constellations, as well as NASA’s TDRSS
constellation.  This practice results in slight modifications to each spacecraft leaving the
factory, and is helpful for improving the overall quality of the product.  One glaring
similarity is that all three programs are large, multi-year government contracts, which makes
it relatively easy for the contractor to close the design-build-operate feedback loop within the
company.  However, companies that build small lots of spacecraft (i.e. one) do not have the
same luxury and would require historical discrepancy data from other similar programs in
order to have the same effect.


                                              
9
 Mayes, M. Scott, Felix A. Zambetti III, Stephen G. Harris, Linda K. Fronczak, and Samuel J. McCraw.
“Aerospace Sanctuary in 2025: Shrinking the Bull’s-Eye.”  2025.  Final Report, vol. 2, ch. 8.  Maxwell AFB:
Air University, 1996.  p. 2.
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Applications for Discrepancy Data

There are several different uses for discrepancy data, depending on the role of the individual
performing the analysis.  This section summarizes how various groups can use discrepancy
data to enhance the quality of their work.
• System architect.   Trade studies and architectural decisions made early in the
concept exploration phase have a tremendous impact on the final implementation of a
system.  One way to avoid overlooking acceptable solutions is to create an array of
models that allow an automated search of large architectural trade spaces.  The Space
Systems, Policy, and Architecture Research Consortium (SSPARC) methodology is
an example of this approach.  In order to yield meaningful results, however, the
models used for the analysis must contain accurate relationships between the design
inputs and the predicted performance of the resulting architecture.  Although these
relationships are generally well understood for the performance of spacecraft
hardware, the effect design decisions have on the performance of lifecycle operations
is often overlooked or ignored.  Historical discrepancy data can help the system
architect develop operations models using accurate, realistic relationships.

• Spacecraft designer.   Engineers occasionally face choices on how to implement a
particular design specification in a spacecraft.  A typical trade study will include
factors like power requirements, weight restrictions, thermal characteristics, etc.
Current best practices also include factoring the reliability of the component into the
trade study, and perhaps consulting with an operations representative to get a feel for
which solution would be preferred.  Discrepancy data would also allow the engineer
to consider the impact of his or her decision on the operability of the spacecraft as
another variable in the trade study, as proposed by Brandon Wood in “Development
of an Operability Metric for Analysis of Conceptual Space Systems.”10

• Operations manager.   Operations managers can use the methodology outlined in
Chapter 5 to analyze their own organization’s discrepancy data.  The analysis will
                                              
10
 Wood, Brandon and Joyce Warmkessel.  “Development of an Operability Metric for Analysis of Conceptual
Space Systems.”  Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001.
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help identify recurring problems as areas for improvement.  When compared with
discrepancy data from other organizations, managers can benchmark their
performance and determine whether better solutions to their problems are available in
the community at large.

• Program manager.  In the most general sense, discrepancy data will help program
managers understand the effect of discrepancies on the lifecycle cost of the space
system.  In situations where they are presented with alternate implementations for a
new system or proposed changes to an existing system, program managers can use
cost figures and mission impact reports from existing discrepancy data to perform a
thorough cost-benefit analysis and make a well-informed decision.

The most noteworthy point regarding these applications is that, in almost all cases, detailed
discrepancy data already exists.  Most organizations do a thorough job documenting
problems as they occur.  Unfortunately, the logs are typically used only for short-term
problem tracking and resolution.  Occasionally, they are also researched within the
organization and used as a reference when similar problems occur later in the operational
lifetime.  Thus, the hard work of recording the data is already being accomplished – all that
remains is to make use of it.
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Chapter 3 – Research Overview and Hypotheses


The purpose of this research is to characterize the number and type of problems satellite
operators encounter during the course of routine daily activities.  This chapter surveys
existing literature on similar topics, provides an overview of the research strategy, and
presents the specific hypotheses addressed by the study. 

Existing Literature

Past research in the area of operational problems focuses almost exclusively on hardware
failures onboard the spacecraft.  One of the most comprehensive analyses available to the
general public is Herbert Hecht’s technical report, “Reliability Prediction for Spacecraft.”11 
Hecht’s study compiled anomaly reports for over 300 satellites launched between the early
1960s and January 1984.  Spacecraft anomalies were categorized according to cause and
affected subsystem, and the subsequent results used to update the MIL-HDBK-217 model for
predicting spacecraft reliability.

More recent anomaly analyses are performed by the Aerospace Corporation’s Space
Operations Support Office (SOPSO), which maintains an anomaly database with historical
data for over 400 satellites.  Operational failure modes are identified based on cause,
equipment type, and subsystem.12   Correlation studies are performed to determine the effect
of space weather and other factors on overall spacecraft performance.

Some studies focus on spacecraft anomalies caused by specific conditions or anomalies that
occur in special circumstances.  One example is Tosney and Boeck’s compilation of satellite
anomalies caused by the Leonid meteor shower.13   There are also several papers that examine
                                              
11
 Hecht, Herbert, and Myron Hecht.  “Reliability Prediction for Spacecraft.”  Technical report.  Griffiss Air
Force Base, NY: Rome Air Development Center.  December 1985.
12
 The Aerospace Corporation.  “SOPSO Resources.”  Online reference,
http://www.aero.org/sopso/resources.html, March 15, 2001.
13
 Tosney, W.F., and M.L. Boeck.  “Integrated satellite anomaly database – Overview, community access, and
plans for future environemental events.”  Leonid II Meteoroid Storm and Satellite Threat Conference,
Manhattan Beach, CA, May 11-13, 1999, Proceedings.  Los Angeles, CA: Aerospace Corporation, 1999.
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various hardware anomalies caused by the radiation environment.14   The effects of many
different types of space-related phenomena have been studied in detail and documented.

Such studies are valuable for calculating hardware failure rates, reliability specifications, and
model calibration constants, but do not capture the full scope of problems that an operator
might face.  On a routine day-to-day basis, satellite operators may encounter problems
completely unrelated to the spacecraft and unaffected by its performance.  This fact prompted
the first hypothesis of this study, described later in this chapter.

Hypotheses

Although the discrepancy data collected for this study can help individual organizations
answer several types of questions particular to their unique environment, the scope of the
study is intended to address more broadly applicable issues.  It examines and tests the
following statements:
• First hypothesis. Most problems encountered by an operator do not involve the
spacecraft at all, but are attributed to other elements of the space system.

• Second hypothesis.  Correlations exist between aspects of a space system design and
the nature of problems experienced by the operations staff over the long term.

The first hypothesis investigates the notion that the infrastructure of a space system is
generally more problem-prone than the spacecraft itself.  Although there is a measure of
agreement within the operational community that this assertion is true,15  it has not yet been
proved or disproved in an analytical fashion.  For the purposes of this study, the
infrastructure of a space system consists of the following:
• Ground system.   Includes both the hardware and software deployed to decrypt,
decommutate, calibrate, display, and archive satellite telemetry and mission data.
                                              
14
 Lauriente, M., A.L. Vampola, R. Koga, and R. Hosken.  “Analysis of spacecraft anomalies due to the
radiation environment.”  Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, vol. 36, no. 6, Nov-Dec 1999, pp. 902-906.
15
 Based on interviews with satellite operators from several different organizations.
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Also includes equipment used to format, validate, and encrypt commands.  Most
elements of the human-computer interface fall into this category.

• Communications relay.   Includes routers, switches, patch panels, landlines,
microwave transmissions, satellite relays, ground station antennas and RF equipment,
and communication satellites.  The exact equipment included in this category varies
greatly depending on the ops concept used for a particular mission, and may be
anything from a single, dedicated satellite dish to a shared, global communications
network.

• Tracking equipment.  Includes hardware and software necessary to perform RF
and/or optical pointing and ranging techniques.  This equipment is often collocated
with elements of the communications relay, but may also be provided by an external
source as a service to the program.

• Facilities.   Includes the physical structures in which equipment and personnel are
housed, access controls to said structures, utilities such as water and electricity, and
heating and cooling systems.

• Administrative equipment.   Includes all other hardware and software used to
support operations either directly or indirectly, like telephones, fax machines, offline
computers, printers, etc.

The second hypothesis investigates the possibility that certain design choices typically made
early in the product development phase correlate with specific, predictable types of problems
experienced in the operational phase.  Care is taken here not to imply that such correlations
indicate cause-and-effect relationships.  Since the true root cause in each relationship may
vary from one satellite design to another, root cause analyses should be performed on a case-
by-case basis and are therefore outside the scope of this research.  However, the presence of a
correlation definitely indicates an area that merits further investigation.  The specific design
elements examined as part of this study are:
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• Mission type
• Communications relay scheme
• Spacecraft altitude
• Orbit characteristics
• Attitude control scheme
• Complexity
• Multiple spacecraft/constellation

Details concerning each design element are included in Chapter 4.  The design elements were
selected on the basis of availability of pertinent data and the likelihood of a correlation.
Additional design elements that failed to meet both of the criteria, but are still valid for future
study, include:
• Available reserve on-board memory capacity at launch
• Telemetry/command format used
• Type of ground system software used
• Number of telemetry measurands sampled
• Communications subsystem link margin at launch
• Thermal subsystem design margin at launch
• Solar array/battery type

Research Structure

This research stems from key questions facing the Test & Space Operations focus team
within LAI: 
• What kinds of problems are operators having? 
• Can we do anything to fix existing problems, predict new ones, and ultimately
prevent them from occurring? 

Recognizing that anomalous conditions increase the variability and cost of performing
satellite operations, it is desirable to avoid or prevent problems wherever possible.  It is not
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coincidental that these two questions directly relate to the lean principles of eliminating
waste and pursuing perfection.  The rest of this section provides an overview of how these
two questions were translated into the analysis method described in Chapter 5.

Although it may be possible to address the first key question within a strictly theoretical
framework, such an approach can easily become divorced from reality.  Therefore, the best
way to answer the question is to characterize the types of actual problems satellite operators
experience over the lifetime of each vehicle they control.  Normally, an applied approach like
this would require researchers to implement data collection procedures at each facility
targeted for study. 

Fortunately, it is and has been fairly common in the satellite operations community to log
problems, or symptoms of problems, when they occur.  Thus, the most labor-intensive, long-
term work has already been performed.  What remained was to collect the factual data from a
fairly large sample of organizations.  This proved to be more difficult than expected, due to
the reasons discussed in Chapter 2.

Since there is no industry standard format for logging discrepancy data, it was also necessary
to develop procedures to merge each log on a case-by-case basis.  For some databases, it was
merely a matter of selecting appropriate fields for inclusion.  For others, the procedure
involved manually reviewing each discrepancy in order to properly categorize it.  Once the
submitted data was compiled into one data set, a thorough analysis could be performed using
well-established statistical techniques.

The second key question is more difficult to attack.  Although the main thrust of the question
is to fix existing problems and eventually prevent new problems from occurring, such an
ambitious goal is beyond the scope of this research.  The focus will be instead to find an
additional tool for predicting problems before they occur.  In a risk-adverse community such
as the aerospace sector, this goal alone would be helpful if accomplished.  And once the
problems are identified, managers, engineers, and operators have considerable knowledge
and expertise in dealing with them.
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One way to predict future problems is by investigating trends in the discrepancy reports from
similar spacecraft that already on-orbit.  Since a comprehensive data set of operational
discrepancies was already required to address the first key question, what remained was
finding relationships between the recorded problems and an unknown set of independent
variables.  This research had to identify one of the true independent variables and then
determine its relationship to the dependent variables, the number and type of problems that
occur during lifecycle operations.

The method used to accomplish this task was a simple, brute force approach.  In other words,
a candidate independent variable was selected, and then analyzed to determine if a
relationship existed with the dependent variables.  If no correlation existed, the candidate
independent variable was discarded.  If a correlation did exist, a ‘true’ independent variable
was considered found.  Since the number of possible independent variables is virtually
unlimited, the pool from which candidate variables were chosen was narrowed down using
three criteria:
• Design element.   To begin with, only elements of a typical spacecraft design were
considered for analysis in this study.

• Potential for correlation.   The candidate independent variables selected for
examination were those for which intuition suggested a possible relationship.

• Availability of data.   Of the remaining variables, the ones finally studied were those
for which sufficient data existed to perform the analysis.

The convergence of the three criteria is reflected in the second hypothesis, below.  The
approach just described does not predict a problem per se, but identifies the potential for a
problem to occur.  The shortcomings to this approach – namely, predicting future problems
based on past performance, merging data collected using different procedures, and the
existence of other untested independent variables – will be discussed in more detail in
Chapter 7.
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Chapter 4 – Discrepancies Defined


This paper defines a discrepancy as the perception by an operator that some portion of the
space system has failed to operate as designed.  Thus, discrepancies can include ground
system malfunctions, procedural errors, and even misdiagnosis that a problem exists – in
addition to actual spacecraft anomalies.  This chapter further defines discrepancies by
describing the information collected for each one, outlining their possible causes, and
describing the affected subsystems.

Data Collected for Each Discrepancy

As noted previously, operators log discrepancy events each time they occur.  Since there is
no standardized format, the information included in each log varies from one organization to
another.  Procedures at one facility may call for a very detailed report of the circumstances
surrounding the incident and the resulting action taken, while procedures at another facility
may require only a brief description of the symptoms observed.  In addition, the logs vary
considerably based on the style of the operator actually recording the data. 

For the purpose of this study, however, a minimum standard discrepancy report had to be
defined.  Due to level of variation in the source data, only the most basic information was
included in the format to avoid excluding substantial blocks of source data.  The fields
chosen for the discrepancy format were:
• Organization.   The pseudonym used to represent the organization responsible for
operating the spacecraft.

• Satellite associated with discrepancy.   The pseudonym used to represent the
specific satellite associated with the discrepancy.  In some cases, discrepancies were
not associated with any one particular spacecraft and were noted as such.

• Date of discrepancy.   The date on which the discrepancy occurred.
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• Description of discrepancy.   A brief summary of the discrepancy.  Any identifying
information was replaced with a generic designator.

• Affected subsystem.   The subsystem within the space system most closely
associated with the discrepancy.  The categorization system used for the field is
described later in this chapter.

• Root cause (if identified).  When available in the source data, the root cause of the
discrepancy was included in the report.  Discrepancies for which the root cause was
not identified were not included in any analysis requiring the information.  The
categorization system used for the field is described later in this chapter.

In addition to the information collected for each discrepancy, several data points pertaining to
design elements were collected for each spacecraft.  The data points were then linked to all
the discrepancies associated with the corresponding spacecraft.  The design elements
consisted of the following:
• Mission type.   The category that best describes the mission of the spacecraft.
Choices include remote sensing, communications, research & development, weather,
observatory, and other.

• Communications relay scheme.   Examines the primary method used to relay
spacecraft commands, state of health telemetry, and payload data from the mission
control center to the spacecraft and back.  Choices include one dedicated ground
station; multiple dedicated ground stations; shared ground station network,
specifically the NASA Deep Space Network, the Air Force Satellite Control Network,
and the NASA GN; other shared ground station network; and shared space relay
network, specifically NASA TDRSS.

• Spacecraft altitude.  Examines the altitude region in which the satellite operates.
Choices include low, for orbits located entirely in the region below 1,000 km
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altitude16; medium, for orbits located entirely in the region 1,000 – 25,000 km
altitude; high, for orbits located entirely in the region above 25,000 km altitude; and
multiple, for elliptical orbits passing through two or more of the previous regions.17

• Orbit characteristics.   Examines a subset of special cases for the type of orbit used.
Choices include sun-synchronous; polar, for polar and near-polar orbits with an
inclination in the range 83° − 97° (other than sun-synchronous); geosynchronous;
geosynchronous transfer orbit; and South Atlantic Anomaly, for orbits which pass
through the SAA.  Note that these categories do not include all possible orbit
configurations.  These special cases were singled out due to the potential for specific
types of discrepancies associated with each one.

• Attitude control scheme.  Examines the type of attitude control incorporated in the
spacecraft design.  Choices include gravity gradient stabilized, spin stabilized, three-
axis stabilized, and free tumble.

• Complexity.   This general qualitative description is a composite of several design
elements, including number of telemetry measurands sampled, number of nodes in
the communications relay, number of payloads on board the spacecraft, acceptable
tolerances for operating constraints (e.g. pointing accuracy, stationkeeping window,
and thermal limits), complexity of onboard software, and time criticality for
performing operational activities.  Choices include low, medium, and high.

• Multiple spacecraft/constellation.   Examines whether the satellite is part of a
production line of multiple similar spacecraft, and if so, whether the spacecraft is the
first off the line.  Choices include no, first, and yes.
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 Gorney, D.J., J.B. Blake, H.C. Koons, M. Schulz, A.L. Vampola, R.L. Walterscheid, and J.R. Wertz.  “The
Space Environment and Survivability.”  Space Mission Analysis and Design.  2nd ed.  Torrance, CA:
Microcosm, 1993.  pp. 199-201.
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Lastly, each organization included in the data set was categorized as one of the following
types: civil, military, commercial, academic, and other.  The data for organization type was
then linked to all the discrepancies reported by the corresponding organization.  The
categorization system described above provided a concise way to group similar types of
discrepancies during the analysis process.

Causes of Discrepancies

Discrepancies can be caused by a number of factors.  When a root cause was identified in the
source data, one of the following categories was assigned to the corresponding discrepancy:18
• Employee/operator.   Discrepancies caused by a person incorrectly executing a
procedure, sending an unintended command, altering mission critical equipment, etc.

• Design.  Discrepancies caused by problems in the design of the spacecraft or ground
system.  Applied in cases where the component in question is verified as meeting
design specifications but still causing an undesirable condition.

• Procedure.   Discrepancies caused when a procedure is executed as written and later
identified as incorrectly planned.  Weigel’s paper originally included this category as
part of Design, but is separated here due to the procedural nature of operations.

• Material.   Discrepancies caused by defective equipment, parts, material, etc. on the
spacecraft, as can best be determined through analysis.  Also includes equipment or
components on the spacecraft that have failed to meet design specifications.

• Equipment.   Discrepancies caused by defective equipment, communications lines,
computers, cables, etc. not on the spacecraft.  This category focuses primarily on
instances of verified hardware failure.
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 Weigel, A.L.  “Spacecraft System-Level Integration and Test Discrepancies: Characterizing Distributions and
Costs.”  Cambridge, MA:  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000.  pp. 25-26.
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• Software.   Discrepancies caused by software, either on the spacecraft or on the
ground equipment.  Includes problems caused by hung processes, or instances where
a computer reboot is required to restore functionality.

• Interference.   Discrepancies caused by radio frequency interference with other
spacecraft, communications relay line quality degradation or noise, or scheduling
conflicts with other spacecraft.

• Weather.   Discrepancies caused by external environmental factors, including storms
that affect ground stations, single event upsets on the spacecraft caused by radiation,
problems associated with suspected debris or meteor hits, etc.

• No Anomaly.   Discrepancies written up in error, or determined later to not be
anomalies, etc.  This includes discrepancy reports written up for informational
purposes, or to request adjustments to telemetry limit values.

• Unknown.   Discrepancies whose cause is unknown or unable to be determined.

• Other.   Discrepancies that do not fall into the previous eight categories.

In general, discrepancies have one root cause.  In the occasional case that a discrepancy had
two or more root causes, it counted against the multiple corresponding categories above.

Affected Subsystems

Discrepancies are usually associated with one particular subsystem or another.  The
following categories were used for subsystems onboard the spacecraft:
• Electrical Power and Distribution System (EPDS).  EPDS’s primary function
includes the generation, regulation, storage, and distribution of electrical/electronic
power throughout the vehicle.  Other names: Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS),
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Power Subsystem, Power.  19   Includes, but is not limited to, solar arrays, batteries,
switching circuitry, and power supply regulators.

• Guidance, Navigation and Control (GNC).   The GNC subsystem’s primary
function provides determination of orbit and attitude, plus pointing of spacecraft and
appendages.  Other names: Attitude Control Subsystem (ACS), Attitude
Determination and Control Subsystem (ADCS).20   Includes, but is not limited to, sun
sensors, horizon sensors, gyros, magnetic torquers, GPS receiving equipment, and
attitude determination and control processors.

• Payload.   The payload subsystem’s primary function provides mission specific
capabilities to the space vehicle’s functionality.  This is the single most significant
driver of spacecraft design.  Payloads have various capabilities such as
communication, navigation, science, imaging, radar, and others.21

• Propulsion (Prop).   The propulsion subsystem’s primary function provides thrust to
adjust orbit and attitude, and to manage angular momentum.  Other names: Reaction
Control Subsystem (RCS).22   Includes, but is not limited to, propellant tanks,
thrusters, plumbing, and valves.

• Structures and Mechanisms Subsystem (SMS).  SMS’s primary function provides
support structure, booster adaptation, and moving parts.  Other names: Structural,
Structures and Mechanisms.23   Includes, but is not limited to, trusses, panels, hinges,
and pyrotechnics.
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 Quintero, A.H.  “Space Vehicle Anomaly Reporting System (SVARS) Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
Template.”  Los Angeles, CA:  Aerospace Corporation, 1996.  p. 26.
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Template.”  Los Angeles, CA:  Aerospace Corporation, 1996.  p. 26.
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Template.”  Los Angeles, CA:  Aerospace Corporation, 1996.  p. 26.
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• Data Management Subsystem (DMS).   The Data Management Subsystem’s primary
function distributes commands and accumulates, stores, and formats data from the
spacecraft and payload.  Other names: Command and Data Handling (C&DH),
Spacecraft Computer System, Spacecraft Processor.24   Includes, but is not limited to,
telemetry sampling circuitry, solid state memory, data recorders, and central
processors.

• Telemetry, Tracking, and Command (TT&C).   The TT&C subsystem’s primary
function provides communication with ground and other spacecraft.  Uplink data
consists of commands and ranging tones while downlink data consists of status
telemetry, ranging tones, and may include payload data.  Other names:
Communications Subsystem.  Includes, but is not limited to, receivers, transmitters,
and wide-angle antennas.25

• Thermal.   The Thermal Control Subsystem’s primary function maintains spacecraft
equipment within allowed temperature range.  Other names: TCS, Environmental
Control Subsystem (ECS).  Includes, but is not limited to, radiators, louvers, heat
sinks, heaters, and cryogenic cooling systems.26

• Wiring and Cabling (Harness).   Wiring and cabling that is not considered part of a
particular subsystem called out above.27

• Other Spacecraft.   Discrepancies that are traceable down to the subsystem level, but
the subsystem does not fall into one of the above categories.28

                                              
24
 Quintero, A.H.  “Space Vehicle Anomaly Reporting System (SVARS) Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
Template.”  Los Angeles, CA:  Aerospace Corporation, 1996.  p. 26.
25
 Quintero, A.H.  “Space Vehicle Anomaly Reporting System (SVARS) Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
Template.”  Los Angeles, CA:  Aerospace Corporation, 1996.  p. 26.
26
 Quintero, A.H.  “Space Vehicle Anomaly Reporting System (SVARS) Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
Template.”  Los Angeles, CA:  Aerospace Corporation, 1996.  p. 26.
27
 Weigel, A.L.  “Spacecraft System-Level Integration and Test Discrepancies: Characterizing Distributions and
Costs.”  Cambridge, MA:  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000.  p. 25.
28
 Weigel, A.L.  “Spacecraft System-Level Integration and Test Discrepancies: Characterizing Distributions and
Costs.”  Cambridge, MA:  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000.  p. 25.
Chapter 4 – Discrepancies Defined
David L. Ferris  41
• Spacecraft.   Discrepancies that cannot be traced down to a particular subsystem
called out above fall into this category.29

The following categories were used for subsystems other than those on the spacecraft:
• Ground System.   Includes both the hardware and software deployed to decrypt,
decommutate, calibrate, display, and archive satellite telemetry and mission data.
Also includes hardware and software used to format, validate, and encrypt
commands.  Most elements of the human-computer interface fall into this category.
This equipment is typically all located in the mission operations control center.

• Communications Relay.   Includes routers, switches, patch panels, landlines,
microwave transmissions, satellite relays, ground station antennas and RF equipment,
and communication satellites.  The exact equipment included in this category varies
greatly depending on the ops concept used for a particular mission, and may be
anything from a single, dedicated satellite dish to a shared, global communications
network.

• Tracking Equipment.   Includes hardware and software necessary to perform RF
and/or optical pointing and ranging techniques.  This equipment is often collocated
with elements of the communications relay, but may also be provided by an external
source as a service to the program.

• Facilities.   Includes the physical structures in which equipment and personnel are
housed, access controls to said structures, utilities such as water and electricity, and
heating and cooling systems.

• Administrative Equipment.   Includes all other hardware and software used to
support operations either directly or indirectly, like telephones, fax machines, offline
computers, printers, etc.
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 Weigel, A.L.  “Spacecraft System-Level Integration and Test Discrepancies: Characterizing Distributions and
Costs.”  Cambridge, MA:  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000.  p. 25.
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• Other Infrastructure.   Includes subsystems not belonging to any of the five
categories listed above.

In general, discrepancies are associated with one particular subsystem.  In the occasional case
that a discrepancy affected two or more subsystems, it counted against the multiple
corresponding categories above.



Chapter 5 – Methods and Procedures
David L. Ferris  43
Chapter 5 – Methods and Procedures


This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the procedure used to collect, convert, and
merge source discrepancy data from each contributing organization.  Background
information on the statistical methods used to analyze the compiled data set is presented,
along with a description of the steps involved in the actual analysis.

Data Collection Procedure

The first step in collecting source discrepancy data was to contact a member of the operations
staff from each program of interest, either directly or by referral.  Generally, the individual
authorized to release source data – and therefore the best to contact directly – was the
Mission Director, Mission Operations Manager, or equivalent.  A background briefing that
explained the study and its objectives was provided to each participating organization.  After
further discussions and occasionally legal department review, the source data was released
for research purposes.

When provided in the form of hand-written logs, individual entries were first manually
entered into electronic format.  Hardcopy forms and incident reports were scanned using
optical character recognition (OCR) software and reviewed for accuracy.  Source data
provided in the form of proprietary or mission-specific electronic databases were first
exported to tab-delimited text files.  In each of the three cases, the result was a generic text
file containing all the original source data, which could be manipulated by a variety of
software tools.

All of the source data sets used a unique format in terms of structure, data requested, field
names, etc.  In order merge the data into one uniform database, several modifications were
made to each set.  To begin with, a standard data format was defined using a core set of
information common to a large majority of the source sets:
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• Organization.   The pseudonym used to represent the organization responsible for
operating the spacecraft.

• Satellite associated with discrepancy.   The pseudonym used to represent the
specific satellite associated with the discrepancy.  In some cases, discrepancies were
not associated with any one particular spacecraft and were noted as such.

• Date of discrepancy.   The date on which the discrepancy occurred.

• Title.  A short identifier for the discrepancy entry, usually a phrase or single sentence.

• Description.   A brief summary of the discrepancy.  Any identifying information was
replaced with a generic designator.

• Affected subsystem.   The subsystem within the space system most closely
associated with the discrepancy.  The categorization system used for the field is
described in Chapter 4.

• Root cause (if identified).  When available in the source data, the root cause of the
discrepancy was included in the report.  Discrepancies for which the root cause was
not identified comprised 7% of all reports collected, and were not included in any
analysis requiring that information. 

Unnecessary or extraneous data fields were removed from the source data sets, and the
pseudonym for the contributing organization was added to every entry in the file.  In a few
cases, the source data set did not explicitly break out one of the fields listed above (e.g.
affected subsystem), and the data for that field had to be manually extracted from one of the
other fields, usually the description.  Figure 5 shows the database tool used to review and
import each discrepancy report.  Following these modifications, the data sets uniformly
consisted of the information listed above.
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Figure 5 – Discrepancy Report Import Tool


The remaining data preparation steps were accomplished to address concerns about the
release of proprietary data.  Any occurrence in the data of a spacecraft name was replaced
with the corresponding pseudonym.  References to payload instruments, personnel teams,
unique facilities, or specific equipment configurations were replaced with generic descriptive
terms.  At this point in the process, each data set was purged of identifying information and
ready to be added to the discrepancy database.

Statistics Background

It is important to note that the true population of interest is the set of all discrepancies
occurring for all spacecraft launched by all nations since the first satellite, Sputnik.  The only
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caveat is that recent discrepancy data is more relevant, and therefore of more interest, than
discrepancy data from older programs.  Unfortunately, it is impossible to measure the entire
population, for reasons discussed in Chapter 7.  Therefore, only a sample of the population
was collected and measured for this study.  Discrepancy data for on-orbit spacecraft were
requested from several organizations in a variety of mission areas.  Strictly speaking, the
emphasis on spacecraft that are currently operational is not a representative sample of the
entire population.  It does, however, capture data that is the most relevant to other current and
future programs.

Key characteristics of the sample set are used to draw conclusions about the greater
population.  Although this approach is well established and widely accepted, it is necessary
to verify the proper application of the technique to this particular case.  Since they form the
foundation of the analysis conducted here, the concepts associated with basic inferential
statistics are briefly reviewed next.  A more thorough treatment of the subject can be found in
Mendenhall and Sincich’s Statistics for Engineering and the Sciences.30
Measures of Central Tendency
Measures of central tendency are the first of four groups of numerical descriptive measures
computed from a set of quantitative data.  They are a collection of mathematical techniques
used to help locate the center of the relative frequency distribution.  Each technique has
strengths and weaknesses that make it more useful and accurate in some cases, but not others.
The ‘best’ measure of central tendency for a given data set depends both on the type of
descriptive information desired and the nature of the data being evaluated.  This section
reviews all of the measures of central tendency used in the discrepancy analysis.
Sample Mean
The sample mean of a set of n  measurements, y1, y2, …, y3, taken from a larger population is
the average of the measurements:
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 Mendenhall, William and Terry Sincich.  Statistics for Engineering and the Sciences.  3rd ed.  San Francisco,
CA: Dellen Publishing Company, 1992. 
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Although the mean is often the preferred measure of central tendency, it is sensitive to very
large or very small observations.  Consequently, the mean will shift toward the direction of
skewness and may be misleading in some situations.31
Sample Median
The median of a set of n  measurements, y1, y2, …, y3, is the middle number when the
measurements are arranged in ascending (or descending) order.  In other words, it is the
value of y located so that half the area under the relative frequency histogram lies to its left
and half the area lies to its right.  If the number of measurements in a data set is odd, the
median is the measurement that falls directly in the middle when the measurements are
arranged in ascending order.  If the number of measurements is even, the median is defined
as the average of the two middle measurements when the measurements are arranged in
ascending order.  The median is sometimes called a resistant measure of central tendency
since it, unlike the mean, is resistant to the influence of extreme observations.  For data sets
that are extremely skewed, the median would better represent the center of the distribution
data.32
5% Trimmed Mean
The 5% trimmed mean represents a compromise between the two extremes of sample mean
and sample median.  It is computed by ordering the values within the data set from smallest
to largest, trimming 5% of the values from the top and 5% of the values from the bottom of
the data set, and then computing the usual sample mean as described above for the data that
remain.  This prevents unusual outlier and extreme values in the tails of the distribution from
affecting the size of the sample mean, and makes the trimmed mean measurement more
resistant than the sample mean measurement.  While it still is not as resistant as the sample
median measurement, the benefit of the trimmed mean measurement is that it is based on
                                              
31
 Entire paragraph drawn from Mendenhall, William and Terry Sincich.  Statistics for Engineering and the
Sciences.  3rd ed.  San Francisco, CA: Dellen Publishing Company, 1992.  pp. 28-29.
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 Entire paragraph drawn from Mendenhall, William and Terry Sincich.  Statistics for Engineering and the
Sciences.  3rd ed.  San Francisco, CA: Dellen Publishing Company, 1992.  pp. 28-29.
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more values than the sample median measurement while effectively dealing with outliers and
extreme values.33   The number of data points to be excluded from each tail of the data set is
calculated by multiplying the total number of observations by 0.05 and rounding the result
down to the nearest integer.
Measures of Variation
Measures of variation are the second group of numerical descriptive measures.  They are a
collection of mathematical techniques used to describe the spread of measurements over the
entire range of values.  As before, each technique has strengths and weaknesses that make it
more useful and accurate in some cases, but not others.  The ‘best’ measure of variation for a
given data set depends both on the type of descriptive information desired and the nature of
the data being evaluated.  This section reviews all of the measures of variation used in the
discrepancy analysis.
Sample Range
The range is equal to the difference between the largest measurement and the smallest
measurement in a data set.  It is possible that two different data sets could possess the same
range, but differ greatly in the amount of variation in the data.  Consequently, the range is a
relatively insensitive measure of data variation.34
Sample Variance
The sample variance of a set of n  measurements, y1, y2, …, y3, taken from a larger population
is defined to be:
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 Entire paragraph drawn from Wilcox, Rand R.  Statistics for the Social Sciences.  San Diego: Academic
Press, 1996.  pp. 15-16.
34
 Entire paragraph drawn from Mendenhall, William and Terry Sincich.  Statistics for Engineering and the
Sciences.  3rd ed.  San Francisco, CA: Dellen Publishing Company, 1992.  pp. 30-31.
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The sample variance is primarily of theoretical significance, but is important in that it is used
to derive the sample standard deviation.35
Sample Standard Deviation
The standard deviation of a sample of n measurements is equal to the square root of the
variance:

1
)(
1
2
2
−
−
==
 
=
n
yy
ss
n
i
i
 (3)

The standard deviation as a measure of data variation is easily interpreted by means of a rule
of thumb known as the Empirical Rule.36
The Empirical Rule
If a data set has an approximately mound-shaped relative frequency distribution, then the
following rules of thumb may be used to describe the data set:
• Approximately 68% of the measurements will lie within 1 standard deviation of their
mean (i.e. within the interval sy ±  for samples).
• Approximately 95% of the measurements will lie within 2 standard deviations of their
mean (i.e. within the interval sy 2±  for samples).
• Almost all the measurements will lie within 3 standard deviations of their mean (i.e.
within the interval sy 3±  for samples).
The percentages given in the rule are only approximate, particularly for the first interval of
one standard deviation.  The percentage of the total number of measurements that fill within
two standard deviations of their mean will usually be quite close to 95%.  The Empirical
Rule is the result of the practical experience of researchers in many fields who have observed
its validity with many different types of data sets.37
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 Entire paragraph drawn from Mendenhall, William and Terry Sincich.  Statistics for Engineering and the
Sciences.  3rd ed.  San Francisco, CA: Dellen Publishing Company, 1992.  pp. 30-31.
36
 Entire paragraph drawn from Mendenhall, William and Terry Sincich.  Statistics for Engineering and the
Sciences.  3rd ed.  San Francisco, CA: Dellen Publishing Company, 1992.  pp. 30-31.
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Skewness
Skewness characterizes the degree of asymmetry of a distribution around its mean. Positive
skewness indicates a distribution with an asymmetric tail extending toward more positive
values. Negative skewness indicates a distribution with an asymmetric tail extending toward
more negative values.38   The equation for skewness is:
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Kurtosis
Kurtosis characterizes the relative peakedness or flatness of a distribution compared with the
normal distribution. Positive kurtosis indicates a relatively peaked distribution. Negative
kurtosis indicates a relatively flat distribution.39   The equation for kurtosis is:
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Measures of Relative Standing
Measures of relative standing are the third group of numerical descriptive measures.  They
are a collection of mathematical techniques used to describe the relative position of an
observation within the data set.  In certain situations, one can gain additional information
about an observation based on where it falls in the overall distribution.  This section reviews
the various measures of relative standing that are used throughout the discrepancy analysis.
Percentile
The 100pth percentile of a data set is a value of y located so that 100p% of the area under the
relative frequency distribution for the data lies to the left of the 100pth percentile and the
remaining 100(1 – p)% of the area lies to its right.40   The median of a given data set is its 50th
                                              
38
 Entire paragraph drawn from Microsoft Excel 2000 Function Reference.  Redmond, WA: Microsoft
Corporation, 2000.
39
 Entire paragraph drawn from Microsoft Excel 2000 Function Reference.  Redmond, WA: Microsoft
Corporation, 2000.
40
 Mendenhall, William and Terry Sincich.  Statistics for Engineering and the Sciences.  3rd ed.  San Francisco,
CA: Dellen Publishing Company, 1992.  pp. 34-35.
Chapter 5 – Methods and Procedures
David L. Ferris  51
percentile, and the lower and upper quartiles are defined as the 25th and 75th percentiles,
respectively.  The quartile points, and any percentiles in general, are generally not as crisply
defined for small data sets.
Sample Z-Score
The z-score for a value y of a data set is the distance that y lies above or below the mean,
measured in units of the standard deviation:
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By definition, the z-score describes the location of an observation y relative to the mean.
Negative z-scores indicate that the observation lies to the left of the mean; positive z-scores
indicate that the observation lies to the right of the mean.  According to the Empirical Rule,
most of the observations in a data set will be less than 2 standard deviations from the mean
and will therefore have z-scores less than 2 in absolute value.  In addition, almost all
observations will be within 3 standard deviations of the mean and will have z-scores less than
3 in absolute value.41
Outliers
An observation y that is unusually large or small relative to the other values in a data set is
called an outlier.  Outliers typically are attributable to one of the following causes:
• The measurement is observed, recorded, or entered into the computer incorrectly.
• The measurement comes from a different population.
• The measurement is correct, but represents a rare chance event.
The most obvious method for determining whether an observation is an outlier is to calculate
its z-score.  Observations with z-scores greater than 3 in absolute value are considered
outliers.  However, the presence of one or more outliers in a data set can inflate the value of s
used to calculate the z-score.  Consequently, it will be less likely that an errant observation
would have a z-score larger than 3 in absolute value.  Another method for determining
whether an observation is an outlier is calculating the interquartile range, IQR, which is the
difference between the upper and lower quartile values.  Observations less than 1.5(IQR)
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 Entire paragraph drawn from Mendenhall, William and Terry Sincich.  Statistics for Engineering and the
Sciences.  3rd ed.  San Francisco, CA: Dellen Publishing Company, 1992.  p. 36.
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below the lower quartile, or greater than 1.5(IQR) above the upper quartile are suspect
outliers.  Those less than 3(IQR) below the lower quartile, or greater than 3(IQR) above the
upper quartile are highly suspect outliers.  In contrast with z-scores, the values of the
quartiles used to calculate IQR are not affected by the presence of outliers.42
Box Plot
The box plot display is useful for graphically examining the dispersion of the data set.  It was
designed by John Tukey, and is a graphical display that indicates range, quartiles, inter-
quartile range, median, and outliers of a data set.  An annotated sketch of a box plot is shown
in Figure 6.  The bold horizontal line in the middle of the box indicates the sample median.
A single filled square designates the sample mean.  The edges of each box, called hinges,
mark the 25th and 75th percentiles, so that the central 50% of the data values fall within the
range of the box.  The whiskers, or the vertical lines extending up and down from each box,
show the range of values that fall within 1.5(IQR) of the hinges.  Data points that have values
between 1.5(IQR) and 3(IQR) outside the hinges are marked by an open circle, to designate a
suspect outlier.  Data points more than 3(IQR) below the lower hinge or above the upper
hinge are marked by an asterisk, to designate a highly suspect outlier.43
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 Entire paragraph drawn from Mendenhall, William and Terry Sincich.  Statistics for Engineering and the
Sciences.  3rd ed.  San Francisco, CA: Dellen Publishing Company, 1992.  pp. 37-39.
43
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Figure 6 – Annotated Diagram of a Box Plot
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*
Higly suspect outlier


Measures of Correlation
Measures of correlation are the fourth and final group of numerical descriptive measures
used in this study.  They are a collection of mathematical techniques used to describe the
relationship between two variables in a set of observations.  As before, each technique has
strengths and weaknesses that make it more useful and accurate in some cases, but not others.
The ‘best’ measure of correlation for a given data set depends both on the type of descriptive
information desired and the nature of the data being evaluated.
Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient
Since the discrepancy data does not exhibit a normal distribution, a correlation method
designed for this type of data must be used.  In nonparametric regression, tests of model
adequacy do not require any assumptions about the distribution of the random error term;
thus, they are distribution-free.  Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient can be used to test
for correlation between two variables, y and x.  It is found by first ranking the values of each
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variable separately.  Then the coefficient is calculated using the sum of squares of the
deviations for the rankings.44

The correlation coefficient provides a scaleless quantitative measure of the strength of the
linear relationship between x and y.  The value of the coefficient is always between –1 and
+1, regardless of the units of the variables.  Values near 0 imply little or no relationship
between the variables, while values near –1 or +1 indicate a strong relationship.  The values
of –1 and +1 themselves correspond to a situation where all the data points fall exactly on the
least squares line.  Positive values imply that y increases as x increases; negative values
imply that y decreases as x increases.45  

It is important to note that a strong correlation between two variables does not necessarily
imply causality between one and the other.  It merely indicates a mathematical relationship
between the observed values of one variable and the observed values of the other.
Nonparametric Test for Rank Correlation
It is not enough to state that a correlation exists between two variables of interest.  One must
also determine the likelihood of a similar correlation occurring by chance.  Generally, as the
number of observations in the data set increases, the less likely a similar correlation could be
found by chance.  Therefore, each time the correlation coefficient is calculated, it must be
compared to a pre-defined critical value for two-tailed significance.  In this study, only
correlations larger than the critical value for a two-tailed significance of 0.01 were accepted.

Analysis Method

The data collection procedure outlined earlier in the chapter resulted in a database of over
9,200 discrepancies, all categorized according to related subsystem and root cause.  In
addition, each spacecraft was categorized by several unique design parameters, which then
became associated with the corresponding discrepancies for that spacecraft.  This section
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 Portions drawn from Mendenhall, William and Terry Sincich.  Statistics for Engineering and the Sciences.
3rd  ed.  San Francisco, CA: Dellen Publishing Company, 1992.  p. 784.
45
 Portions drawn from Mendenhall, William and Terry Sincich.  Statistics for Engineering and the Sciences.
3rd  ed.  San Francisco, CA: Dellen Publishing Company, 1992.  p. 441.
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describes the steps taken to analyze the compiled data set and obtain the results presented in
Chapter 6.
Category Relative Frequency
For data that is divided into discrete groups or categories, the category relative frequency is
the proportion of the total number of observations that fall into each category.  46   This is the
case with discrepancy data when categorized according to affected subsystem and root cause.
The category relative frequency diagram is similar to a histogram, which is used to depict
absolute or relative frequencies of numerically based data.

Two category relative frequency diagrams were created for the subsystem analysis, one
diagram showing the number of discrepancies occurring in each individual subsystem, and
the second diagram showing the number of discrepancies occurring in spacecraft subsystems
vice infrastructure-related subsystems.  The few database entries that were associated with
multiple subsystems were excluded from this depiction, since each observation must fall into
one and only one category. 
Spacecraft Normalization
As mentioned previously, operations facilities have their own procedures for recording
discrepancy data.  This leads to large variations in the number of discrepancies provided by
each organization as well as the detail provided in each report entry.  This can be problematic
when merging the reports into one data set for analysis, since organizations that contribute
smaller data sets tend to get lost in the noise of organizations that contribute very large
quantities of reports.  In addition, the presence of one very large and unique data set can
potentially skew the results of the entire study.

One solution to this problem, and the one chosen for use here, is to normalize the discrepancy
data on the basis of each spacecraft.  This is accomplished by dividing the number of
discrepancies associated with each subsystem or cause for a given spacecraft by the sum total
of the spacecraft’s discrepancies.  The resulting data observations for the spacecraft are a set
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 Mendenhall, William and Terry Sincich.  Statistics for Engineering and the Sciences.  3rd ed.  San Francisco,
CA: Dellen Publishing Company, 1992.  p. 14.
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of percentages, one for each subsystem or cause, which describes the distribution of
problems among the various categories.

Figure 7 is an example database display for a notional spacecraft.  It shows how the various
design elements are recorded for each spacecraft, and how the number of discrepancy reports
in each associated subsystem category and root cause category is reported.  As an example,
the normalized percentage score of the Communications Relay subsystem for the notional
spacecraft in Figure 7 would be 110/ 300 = 37%.

Figure 7 – Database Display for Notional Spacecraft
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Percentile Rankings
The result of the normalization process is a list of percentages representing the fraction of
discrepancies for each spacecraft that are associated with each subsystem category.  Table 1
is a notional depiction of a portion of the normalized discrepancy data.

Table 1 – Normalized Discrepancy Data for Notional Spacecraft
Spacecraft Ground System Comm Relay DMS Payload •   •   • 
1 35% 5% 20% 5%
2 25% 25% 20% 0%
• 20% 37% 10% 5%
• 80% 10% 0% 0%


Note that for the actual normalized data set, the list includes all spacecraft in the database and
all subsystem categories used in the study.  Each complete row sums to 100% − representing
the total discrepancies for a given spacecraft.  Meanwhile, each column can be analyzed to
determine whether or not the particular subsystem is consistently identified as a problem
across multiple spacecraft programs.  Thus, the column of percentage scores for each
subsystem becomes the basis of the statistical analysis described next.  The root cause
category percentage rankings are treated in a similar fashion.
Statistical Measures
When the column of subsystem percentage scores becomes the basis of analysis, a histogram
is used to show the number of observations that fall within each range of percentage values.
Figure 8 is an example of such a histogram for a set of notional observations in the
Communications Relay subsystem.  The example value calculated above, 37%, appears in
the figure as the only observed value falling in the range of 35 – 40%.
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Figure 8 – Notional Histogram of Percentage Scores for the Comm Relay Subsystem
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The set of observations depicted in Figure 8 can be analyzed using the statistical techniques
described above.  The resulting parameters, shown in Table 2, specify that the sample mean
is 14.41%.  This indicates that on average, 14.41% of the discrepancies reported for each
spacecraft in the data set were associated with the communications subsystem. 

Table 2 – Statistical Parameters for Notional Comm Relay Subsystem
  Mean Median Trim Mean Max Min Range Variance Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Comm Relay 0.1244 0.1000 0.1244 0.3700 0.0500 0.3200 0.0125 0.1118 1.7349 2.2968


The other parameters in Table 2 offer additional insight.  The sample median, 10%, reflects
that a large number of observations in the data set were less than the sample mean.  This is
supported by the skewness value, which represents a distribution with a longer right
(positive) tail.

One disadvantage to the normalization process is that it reduces an extremely large data set
of discrepancy reports down to a data set with the same number of observations as the
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number of spacecraft.  Although a reduced data set is easier to deal with computationally, the
smaller sample size can make statistical parameters less representative.
Correlation Analysis
The final step of the analysis is to check for correlations between the spacecraft design
elements listed in Chapter 4 and the type of discrepancies that occur during operations.  The
normalized discrepancy data, similar to that shown in Table 1, is first grouped according to
like values for one particular design element of interest, for example mission type.  The
groupings are then arranged in ascending order and ranked.  Likewise, the percentages of
discrepancies for a subsystem of interest, like communications relay, are also ranked.
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is then calculated for the two sets of rankings and
compared to the critical value for two-tailed significance. 

This process was repeated for each combination of design element and subsystem category
and each combination of design element and root cause category.  Combinations with a
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient greater than the critical value are reported in Chapter
6, while those weaker than the critical value were discarded.
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Chapter 6 – Results


This chapter presents the results of the analysis described in Chapter 5 when applied to the
discrepancy database.  The general characteristics of the data are reviewed first, followed by
the results pertaining to each hypothesis.  Additional observations based on the root cause
information are presented at the end of the chapter.

Review of Data

The database compiled for this study consisted of over 9,200 discrepancy reports collected
during operation of 11 on-orbit spacecraft.  The mission areas represented by the satellites in
the study included communications, remote sensing, research and development, and
observatories.  The breakdown of mission areas is depicted graphically in Figure 9.

Figure 9 – Breakdown of Spacecraft by Mission Area
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Development
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The dates on which the discrepancies occurred ranged from June 1992 to March 2001.  The
distribution of discrepancies as well as the number of operational spacecraft in the database
throughout the time period is shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10 – Distribution of Discrepancies Reported by Date
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Several civil and military organizations contributed data for this analysis.  The breakdown of
all spacecraft according to the organizations responsible for operating them is depicted
graphically in Figure 11.  It is important to note that there are no commercial systems
represented in this study.
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Figure 11 – Breakdown of Spacecraft by Responsible Organization
Military
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The nature and validity of the sampling of spacecraft included in this study is discussed
further in Chapter 7.

First Hypothesis

The first hypothesis proposed in this study was that most problems encountered by an
operator do not involve the spacecraft at all, but are attributed to other elements of the space
system.  The most direct way to address the issue is to report the number of discrepancies
belonging to each subsystem category.  This is accomplished with the category relative
frequency diagram shown in Figure 12.  The diagram indicates that the two subsystems most
frequently associated with discrepancies are ground systems and communications relays. 
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Figure 12 – Percentage of All Discrepancies Reported vs. Associated Subsystem
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The next step is to group the various subsystems according to whether they are located on the
spacecraft or within the operational infrastructure.  The subsystems located on, or associated
with, the spacecraft include: EPDS, GNC, payload, propulsion, SMS, DMS, TT&C, thermal,
harness, other spacecraft, and spacecraft.  The subsystems considered part of the operational
infrastructure include: ground systems, communications relay, tracking equipment, facilities,
administrative equipment, and other infrastructure.  Detailed explanations of the individual
categories can be found in Chapter 4.  The percentage of all discrepancies reported against
each major grouping – spacecraft or infrastructure – is shown in the category relative
frequency diagram in Figure 13.


               Infrastructure

               Spacecraft
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Figure 13 – Percentage of All Discrepancies Reported by Major Grouping
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Figure 13 shows that 87% of all discrepancies are associated with subsystems found in the
operational infrastructure, a clear majority that tends to support the hypothesis.  However, the
category relative frequency diagram can be skewed if one or two outlier spacecraft have an
uncommonly large number of discrepancies associated with infrastructure.  The
normalization process outlined in Chapter 5 is designed to overcome this limitation and
provide a more accurate representation of the data set.

The result of the normalization process is a list of percentages representing the fraction of
discrepancies for each spacecraft that are associated with each subsystem category.  The
percentages in each column can be analyzed to determine whether or not the particular
subsystem is consistently identified as a problem across multiple spacecraft programs.  The
statistical parameters described earlier in Chapter 5 are used for this purpose.  Table 3 shows

               Infrastructure

               Spacecraft
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the resulting statistics for each subsystem against which at least one discrepancy was
reported.

Table 3 – Resulting Statistics for Each Subsystem 47
  Mean Median Trim Mean Max Min Range Variance Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Ground System 0.6578 0.8378 0.6578 0.9450 0.2058 0.7392 0.0997 0.3157 -0.6623 -1.7746
Comm Relay 0.1663 0.1053 0.1663 0.5297 0.0018 0.5279 0.0241 0.1551 1.6340 2.2500
Admin Equipment 0.0281 0.0435 0.0281 0.0504 0.0000 0.0504 0.0005 0.0212 -0.5104 -1.8422
Tracking 0.0136 0.0000 0.0136 0.0740 0.0000 0.0740 0.0006 0.0247 1.9094 2.9946
Facilities 0.0038 0.0000 0.0038 0.0129 0.0000 0.0129 0.0000 0.0052 0.8267 -1.2694
Other Infrastructure 0.0144 0.0000 0.0144 0.1579 0.0000 0.1579 0.0023 0.0476 3.3166 11.0000
Payload 0.0200 0.0000 0.0200 0.0865 0.0000 0.0865 0.0010 0.0314 1.3630 0.4639
DMS 0.0459 0.0000 0.0459 0.2105 0.0000 0.2105 0.0059 0.0768 1.5572 1.1334
GNC 0.0218 0.0000 0.0218 0.1540 0.0000 0.1540 0.0022 0.0470 2.6472 7.3777
TT&C 0.0221 0.0000 0.0221 0.1053 0.0000 0.1053 0.0014 0.0373 1.5197 1.1234
EPDS 0.0034 0.0000 0.0034 0.0193 0.0000 0.0193 0.0001 0.0072 1.9462 2.2793
Thermal 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0072 0.0000 0.0072 0.0000 0.0027 1.7935 1.7522
SMS 0.0008 0.0000 0.0008 0.0054 0.0000 0.0054 0.0000 0.0018 2.2433 4.2997
Prop 0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 0.0032 0.0000 0.0032 0.0000 0.0010 3.2982 10.9074
Overall Spacecraft 0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 0.0032 0.0000 0.0032 0.0000 0.0010 3.3166 11.0000


Table 3 contains a great deal of information about each subsystem category.  Using the first
row as an example, an average 65% of discrepancies reported for a given spacecraft are
associated with the ground system.  The median value indicates that there is a fairly large
concentration of spacecraft in the sample for which the ground system accounts for a large
number (~84%) of discrepancies.  The maximum, minimum, and skewness values indicate
that at least one spacecraft with a low number of ground system problems (~21%) is pulling
down the mean and skewing the distribution of percentages downward.

Unfortunately, the detailed information shown in Table 3 is difficult to visualize and
interpret.  Similar information can be presented graphically in the form of a box plot. Figure
14 shows the distribution of percentages for each subsystem category using a box plot.

It is less obvious in Figure 14 than in Figure 13 that the operational infrastructure accounts
for a much larger percentage of discrepancies than spacecraft subsystems.  However, it gives
                                              
47
 Only subsystem categories with at least one discrepancy reported are shown in this table.  The values listed in
the first five columns are decimal percentages.
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a more accurate presentation of the fact that two elements of the operational infrastructure in
particular – ground systems and communications relays – are consistently attributed to
discrepancies across several different spacecraft programs.

Figure 14 – Box Plot of Subsystem Statistics
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Second Hypothesis

The second hypothesis proposed in this study was that correlations exist between aspects of a
space system design and the nature of problems experienced by the operations staff over the
long term.  To address this question, correlation tests were conducted for each combination
of design element and subsystem category.  Combinations with a Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient greater than the critical value are reported below, while those weaker
than the critical value were discarded.
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The correlations between most of the subsystem categories were not statistically significant
based on the sample size and the number of discrepancies reported for each category.  Two
subsystem categories, in particular, did display a strong correlation with elements of the
spacecraft design: ground system and communications relay.  The percentage of each
satellite’s discrepancies associated with each of these two subsystems is listed in Table 4.

Table 4 – Percent of Each Satellite's Discrepancies Associated with Ground System and Comm Relay
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Ground System 37% 23% 21% 84% 82% 93% 91% 87% 86% 25% 94%
Comm Relay 11% 23% 37% 14% 13% 7% 9% 9% 8% 53% 0%


The first correlation presented here is between the mission type of the spacecraft and the
percentage of its discrepancies associated with the ground system.  The Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient for this relationship is 0.852.  Figure 15 shows the percentage of
discrepancies associated with the ground system reported by each spacecraft plotted against
the mission type of the spacecraft.  The correlation indicates that the percentage of problems
associated with the ground system generally changes given a certain mission type.  In other
words, spacecraft performing certain missions tend to experience ground system problems
more frequently than spacecraft performing other missions.  However, it is important to note
that the presence of a correlation does not imply that certain spacecraft mission types cause a
larger percentage of ground system problems than others.
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Figure 15 – Ground System Discrepancies per Spacecraft vs. Mission Type
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The second correlation presented here is between the organization and the percentage of
discrepancies associated with the communications relay.  The Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient for this relationship is 0.850.  Figure 16 shows the percentage of discrepancies
associated with the communications relay reported by each spacecraft plotted against the
organization responsible for operating the spacecraft.  In this case, organization refers to a
group or team that operates one or more spacecraft.  The correlation indicates that the
percentage of problems associated with the communications relay generally changes from
one organization to another.  Once again, it is important to note that the presence of a
correlation does not imply causality.
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Figure 16 – Communications Relay Discrepancies per Spacecraft vs. Organization
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Thus, the data support the second hypothesis, in that a mathematical relationship exists
between certain spacecraft design elements and the nature of operational problems
experienced in the long run.  However, the analysis cannot be considered exhaustive, due to
the presence of multiple variables and a sample set which does not fully explore the values
for each variable in an independent fashion.  This issue is discussed further in Chapter 7.

Additional Observations

Most of the discrepancy data sets contributed for this study contained root cause information
in each report.  Those that did not were excluded from this portion of the analysis.  In a
similar fashion as the subsystem category, the first step is to report the number of
discrepancies belonging to each subsystem category.  This is accomplished with the category
relative frequency diagram shown in Figure 17.  The diagram indicates that software
problems are the most frequent cause of discrepancies, occurring in 61% of the reported
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cases.  The equipment, unknown, procedure, and no anomaly categories were comparable at
approximately 7% each.  As a reminder, “software problems” are defined as discrepancies
caused by software, either on the spacecraft or on the ground equipment.  Includes problems
caused by hung processes, or instances where a computer reboot is required to restore
functionality.  Categories not shown on the graph were not reported on any of the
discrepancies in the data set.

Figure 17 – Percentage of All Discrepancies Reported vs. Root Cause
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The normalization process can also be applied to the root cause analysis to prevent one or
two spacecraft from skewing the results.  When the data is normalized on a per-spacecraft
basis, the resulting statistical parameters for each root cause category are summarized below
in Table 5.  To make the data in Table 5 easier to interpret, it is shown graphically using a
box plot in Figure 18.  The diagram shows that software is the only root cause category
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consistently reported as a frequently occurring problem among all of the spacecraft in the
data set.
Table 5 – Resulting Statistics for Each Root Cause 48
  Mean Median Trim Mean Max Min Range Variance Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Software 0.4773 0.5091 0.4773 0.7585 0.0526 0.7059 0.0405 0.2012 -0.9678 0.7440
No Anomaly 0.0818 0.0489 0.0818 0.2174 0.0000 0.2174 0.0066 0.0812 0.7787 -0.6500
Equipment 0.0884 0.0870 0.0884 0.1739 0.0000 0.1739 0.0034 0.0579 -0.0853 -0.5240
Unknown 0.0800 0.0850 0.0800 0.1739 0.0000 0.1739 0.0035 0.0588 0.3169 -0.5798
Procedure 0.0713 0.0743 0.0713 0.1273 0.0129 0.1144 0.0010 0.0313 -0.2556 0.4560
Operator 0.1167 0.0900 0.1167 0.5789 0.0000 0.5789 0.0257 0.1602 2.8122 8.6573
Interference 0.0309 0.0182 0.0309 0.0868 0.0000 0.0868 0.0011 0.0334 0.6505 -1.2377
Weather 0.0144 0.0000 0.0144 0.1196 0.0000 0.1196 0.0013 0.0357 3.0611 9.6732
Design 0.0158 0.0056 0.0158 0.0541 0.0000 0.0541 0.0004 0.0200 1.0992 -0.0934
Material 0.0045 0.0000 0.0045 0.0236 0.0000 0.0236 0.0001 0.0085 1.8793 2.1706
Other 0.0008 0.0000 0.0008 0.0091 0.0000 0.0091 0.0000 0.0027 3.3166 11.0000


Figure 18 – Box Plot of Root Cause Statistics
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 Only root cause categories with at least one discrepancy reported are shown in this table.  The values listed in
the first five columns are decimal percentages.
Characterization of Operator-Reported Discrepancies in Unmanned On-Orbit Space Systems
72  David L. Ferris


Figure 19 provides more insight into the nature of discrepancies documented as caused by
software.  Over half of the discrepancies caused by software occur in one of the ground
system components.  All told, 91% are associated with components in the infrastructure and
9% are associated with components on board the spacecraft.

Figure 19 – Associated Subsystems for Discrepancies Caused by Software
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The root cause analysis provides insight as to the various sources of discrepancies reported
from several organizations.  Additional discussion concerning these results is included in
Chapter 7.
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               Spacecraft
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Chapter 7 – Discussion and Conclusions


Several aspects of the results presented in Chapter 6 are analyzed in this chapter.  The first
section is an overview of the costs of discrepancies.  The second section is a discussion of the
data sampling technique and the methodology used in this study, as well as general
observations about the data collected.  The final section summarizes the analysis and presents
several recommendations for the use and future extension of this research.

Cost of Discrepancies

Although the occurrences of discrepancies are well documented within most organizations,
the associated costs of dealing with those discrepancies are rarely collected.  There are
several reasons why this is the case:
• Cost information does not come from one source.   Discrepancy cost information
typically includes the number of labor hours that several different individuals spend
in engineering meetings and working groups; the number of labor hours a handful of
individuals spend researching, troubleshooting, and repairing; and the direct expenses
for equipment and materials.  In order to get a complete and accurate representation
of discrepancy costs, everyone and everything involved in the process must be
accounted for.

• Ambiguous nature of discrepancy costs.   The delineation between work necessary
to accomplish a routine task and work spent troubleshooting a specific problem is
difficult to establish in a formal fashion.  In some cases, operators may expend
significant effort troubleshooting a problem before the associated discrepancy report
is even written.  In addition, work spent troubleshooting one particular problem
sometimes serves to correct one or more other problems.  Trying to assign cost to
multiple discrepancies can be difficult and subjective.

• Lack of reporting mechanism.   Even if individual employees track the effort they
expend on discrepancies, there must be a mechanism in place to record and collect the
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information.  Accounting systems in commercial organizations are usually designed
to collect cost data on a contract basis, rather than a functional basis.  Government
organizations – whose employees are salaried – rarely collect labor data at all, and
have no infrastructure in place to do so.

• Cost of collecting cost data itself.   Tracking, recording, reporting, and compiling
cost information takes time and effort.  As the number of functional tasks (including
discrepancies) and the number of employees increase, the work necessary to collect
cost data also increases.  For larger organizations, it can easily require one or more
full-time employees just to deal with the information.  Most organizations choose,
justifiably, not to pay this additional cost.

• No desire or need for discrepancy cost data.   In some organizations,
troubleshooting problems is considered part of the job, so there is no need to
determine exactly how much effort is spent resolving problems versus effort spent
performing routine duties.  In addition, discrepancy cost data is not useful when an
organization does not even track the discrepancies themselves.

Despite the lack of explicit discrepancy cost information, it is possible to estimate the cost of
dealing with problems.  Interviews with the operational supervisors in two of the
participating organizations yielded fairly consistent estimates of the labor required to
troubleshoot a problem.  Those estimates are used in the following cost analysis. 

Generally, discrepancies can be divided into two categories: repetitive or relatively
insignificant problems, and significant problems.  The percentage of significant problems is
roughly equal to the percentage of spacecraft-related problems encountered on-orbit.49   Using
this rule of thumb for all of the spacecraft included in this study, approximately 1200
problems were considered significant and the remaining 8000 were routine.
                                              
49
 Most spacecraft-related problems are – or are treated as – significant.  Repetitive spacecraft-related problems,
once well characterized, tend to receive more cursory treatment or are dealt with using contingency procedures.
Therefore, they can be considered routine.  However, the non-spacecraft infrastructure also occasionally
experiences significant problems that must be accounted for.  Thus, the percentage of problems that are
spacecraft-related is a good approximation for the percentage of problems that are significant.
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Routine problems are typically dealt with first in a daily or weekly status meeting with 6–10
people in attendance.  The group review takes approximately 10 minutes per discrepancy,
and the problem will be assigned to one or two individuals to investigate and/or resolve.  The
average time spent researching, troubleshooting, and resolving a particular problem and
implementing the solution is 8 hours, at which point the results will be reviewed at the status
meeting for another 10 minutes before being closed.  This yields a fully burdened per-
discrepancy cost, not including equipment or materials, of:
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Significant problems, on the other hand, usually involve immediate diagnosis, safing,
notification, and documentation by at least one operator and one on-call engineer for
approximately 3 hours each.  The status meeting attendees receive an initial briefing on the
situation for approximately 20 minutes.  A team of 4–6 individuals spends roughly 8 hours
each, not necessarily consecutive, researching and troubleshooting the problem and
developing a solution.  Two people each spend an additional 3 hours implementing and
testing the solution and documenting the results.  The results are reviewed at the status
meeting for approximately 20 minutes before being closed.  This yields a fully burdened per-
discrepancy cost, not including equipment or materials, of:
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Thus, the estimated annual labor cost of handling discrepancies for the spacecraft in this
study ranged from $390K to $1.16M.  It is important to note that this estimate does not
include the cost of equipment or materials, which can be considerable when the resolution of
a discrepancy requires the purchase or replacement of a major component like a workstation,
server, front-end processor, or ground station antenna motor.
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Discussion
Sampling and Methodology
The true population of interest for a discrepancy data analysis is the set of all discrepancies
occurring on all spacecraft launched since Sputnik.  Obviously, it is not possible to
characterize the entire population directly, so some sampling technique is required.  This
study concentrated on spacecraft that were either currently operational or recently
decommissioned, as of May 2001. 

The sample is not truly representative of the entire population, since it is weighted solely on
operations within the last decade and does not take into account earlier missions.  However,
recently flown spacecraft are more relevant, and therefore of more interest, to existing and
future satellite missions.  Although older discrepancy data would provide a more
comprehensive dataset, in many cases operator logs were not archived or are no longer
available.  Therefore, recent programs were the only ones used in this study.

The correlation analyses performed to test the second hypothesis indicate that correlations do
exist between certain design elements and the types of problems experienced during
operations.  Such analyses require that the sample set be large enough and diverse enough to
differentiate the effects of one design element from the effects of the others.  For example, if
“orbit characteristic” is the design element of interest in a particular analysis, it is desirable to
have every possible value for “orbit characteristic” represented by several spacecraft in the
sample.  This would make it more likely to identify a trend, if one exists.  However, the
sample set used in this study did not fully explore all of the feasible combinations of values
for all of the design elements.  In some cases, like the “attitude control scheme” design
element, the sample set was too uniform to represent the possible types of attitude control
schemes. The results of several analyses were discarded due to this situation.  The problem
can be mitigated in the future by more aggressively selecting spacecraft to include in the
sample set, specifically focusing on spacecraft which fully explore the design element trade
space.
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Observations on Data Collected
The process of merging data originally recorded using different techniques requires care and
attention.  The procedures for reporting problems vary from organization to organization, and
the detail and content of reports can even vary from individual to individual using the same
procedure within a single organization.  In most cases, reviewing and categorizing each
discrepancy report manually can overcome these variations, and was the approach used in
this study.

Per Table 5, software glitches were identified as the root cause in an average of 48% of
discrepancies reported for each spacecraft.  Of all the discrepancies caused by software, 9%
were attributed to spacecraft components and 91% were attributed to infrastructure
components.  It is relevant to note that most of the satellite programs included in this study
used commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software packages and/or hardware for data routing,
telemetry processing, and command & control, or had transitioned from a legacy system to a
COTS-based system at some point during the discrepancy reporting period.

Faulty equipment was found to be the root cause in an average of 9% of discrepancies
reported for each spacecraft.  A review of the corresponding discrepancy reports shows that
equipment problems are most frequently attributed to computer hard drive failures, processor
fan failures, damaged cables, faulty ground antenna amplifier equipment, and facility
power/utility equipment.

Conclusions

This study intended to test the following hypotheses:
• First hypothesis. Most problems encountered by an operator do not involve the
spacecraft at all, but are attributed to other elements of the space system.
• Second hypothesis.  Correlations exist between aspects of a space system design and
the nature of problems experienced by the operations staff over the long term.
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An analysis of over 9,200 discrepancy reports from 11 on-orbit spacecraft supports the first
hypothesis – 87% of the discrepancies collected were attributed to some component of the
operational infrastructure.  The remaining 13% involved one or more components on board
the spacecraft.  Software was the most frequently reported cause of discrepancies, found in
61% of all discrepancies documented. 

The discrepancy reports also indicated that correlations do exist between certain design
elements and the types of problems experienced during operations.  The following
correlations were found based on the data collected:
• Ground System vs. Mission Type.  The percentage of discrepancies per spacecraft
associated with the ground system tends to change given a particular mission type for
the spacecraft.

• Comm Relay vs. Ops Team.   The percentage of discrepancies per spacecraft
associated with the communications relay tends to change from one organization to
another.

Thus, the data collected supports the second hypothesis, but with the caveat that a sufficiently
large and diverse sample set must be obtained to verify the results.  It should be noted that
causality cannot be determined from the statistical correlation analysis, but must be
investigated on a case-by-case basis.

The results of this study can be extended by incorporating discrepancy data from additional
spacecraft, particularly commercial programs.  The methodology can also be applied on
databases for individual satellite programs to gain insight into the nature and frequency of
problems experienced by the operations staff.  Ultimately, this can help supervisors identify
strengths and areas for improvement in attempt to continuously improve the service provided
to the user.
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